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A Journal of International Relations

Astana Skepticism

by: Dr. Nagesh K Ojha

The Palace of Independence witnessed an official accession of the two Asian arch-rivals as full members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). It is worth recalling that in 2005, India, Pakistan, Iran, and Mongolia attended the SCO summit for the first time at Astana in Kazakhstan. On this occasion, interestingly, the Kazhak President, Nursultan Nazarbayev used peculiar words to greet the participants and said that “The leaders of the states sitting at this negotiation table are the representatives of half of humanity.”[1] After twelve years, these are not simply some ceremonial words of a good host but have become a ground reality. This time, the same President got the opportunity to pronounce the accession of new members, “this is the last time we gathered in a six-party format.”

However, in spite of India’s official inclusion in the SCO[2] as a full-fledged member[3], this platform predominantly serves the purpose of China and Russia. It is noteworthy to recall that India, Pakistan, and Iran was conferred an observer member status in the organization in 2005 at the Astana Summit, however, ever since their first participation, the process, and efforts took more than a decade to become a full member along with Pakistan. Iran still has an observer status in the summit. It is simply because of the UN sanctions on Iran. In otherwise, the recently developed situation was equally in favor of Iran wherein Iranian President Hassan Rouhani does tend to join the SCO while Chinese President Xi Jinping fully supports[4] the full membership of Iran.

In this scenario, Russia, China, and Iran, there are three revisionists[5] powers involved in the organization. It is also interesting that relatively a newly established and functional regional organization now keeps four nuclear power states. Therefore, the issue and concerns of nuclear proliferation would come in this background. Terrorism is another cause of concern in the region. China’s approach toward newly inclined, acquired, or having nuclear capacity States has long been debated, in this backdrop, Pakistan is a focused entry as a minimum. It has been working on the low-yield nuclear weapons and to be precise ‘small tactical nuclear weapons’. According to Pervez Hoodbhoy, “the fact that Pakistan was making small tactical nuclear weapons was clear to the world from the day Pakistan started its missile programme…it meant that Pakistan had developed low-yield nuclear warheads to be delivered by those missiles at short ranges, in a battlefield, having localized impact, unlike big bombs designed to destroy cities.” However, it is interesting to recall that Pakistan’s first nuclear reactor was established by the US in 1965 when military dictatorship of Gen Ayub Khan was in full swing. More interestingly, this push and support were given under the ‘Atom for Peace’ programme initiated by the President Dwight D Eisenhower. However, from Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto to a US-trained nuclear and electronics engineer Munir Ahmed Khan (Project 706) to Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the distorted ‘Atom for Peace’ had created enough craving and did lure many others to breed caprice wherein Pakistan got involved in the transferring technology to Iran and Libya in lieu of money. “China is believed to have played a critical role in Pakistan’s nuclear programme, and is said to have helped it manufacture many of its weapons…Nuclear weapons development and advancement in Pakistan is primarily done by the PAEC (Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission) with Chinese collaboration…long-range missile technology was also acquired from North Korea in the 1990s- in exchange for the Pakistani help with its nuclear programme”(BBC 1 December 2010).

In this context, Prof. Walter Russell Mead’s observation that “China, Russia and Iran never bought into the geopolitical settlement that followed the Cold War and they are making increasingly forceful attempts to overturn it” is significant vis-à-vis new efforts and platform. He further explains that the “process will not be peaceful, and whether or not the revisionists succeed, their efforts have already shaken the balance of power and changed the dynamics of international politics”. Therefore, right now, it could seem less significant, but ten-fifteen years down the line, it could become a formidable move, if gets momentum.

In addition, need not to say that in spite of all odds, China has a military and economic relations with North Korea. Its role in the nuclear development programs of North Korea has always been a matter of discussion and debate. However, the Russian approach toward these nations creating more irk to the western powers. In this context, SCO may represent a symbol of a new desire to a polycentric thought process and a new world order. It may create a thrust for some alternative power centers where India would have to face a difficult challenge to manage and balance without Chinese gusto and ebullition.

  Dr. Nagesh K Ojha

[1] Kroth, Olivia. (2012). “Russia, China, Iran close ranks in Tajikistan”, October 30.See more at http://www.pravdareport.com/world/asia/30-10-2012/122620-russia_china_iran-0/#sthash.a7yHWFnQ.dpuf

[2]Founded by five countries 16 years ago, namely China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan.                                                  Все права защищены. Используйте активную ссылку на               inform.kz           http://www.inform.kz/en/nazarbayev-calls-astana-summit-historic-for-sco_a3034514

[3] Kazinform, Astana, 9 June 2017.

[4]  Xinhua News Agency.(2016). “China supports Iran’s application for full membership of SCO”. News (Xinhuanet). Tehran, Iran:  23 January.

[5] Mead, W. R. (2017, June 9). The Return of Geopolitics. Retrieved June 9, 2017, from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2014-04-17/return-geopolitics

Photo courtesy: http://astanatimes.com

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